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INTRODUCTION 
Online hacking from China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and other 
parts of the world has caught the attention of U.S. policymakers, 
commentators, and the American public. For example, the discussion of 
the systematic attacks launched by potentially government-sponsored 
Chinese hackers reinforces the view that China is using all means 
necessary to compete against the United States.1 After years of 
cyberattacks linked to Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army, 
which is also known as the “Comment Crew” or the “Shanghai Group,” 
the U.S. Department of Justice finally issued a symbolic indictment of 
 
 †  Copyright © 2015 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and 
Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School. An earlier version of 
this Article was presented at the “Protecting Trade Secrets in Asia and the United States” 
Conference at John Marshall Law School in Chicago. The Author is grateful to Doris Long for 
her hospitality, and Derek Bambauer and the conference participants for their valuable comments 
and suggestions. 
 1 For discussions of China’s cyberthreat, see generally CHINA AND CYBERSECURITY: 
ESPIONAGE, STRATEGY, AND POLITICS IN THE DIGITAL DOMAIN (Jon R. Lindsay et al., 2015) 
[hereinafter CHINA AND CYBERSECURITY]; DENNIS F. POINDEXTER, THE CHINESE INFORMATION 
WAR: ESPIONAGE, CYBERWAR, COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL AND RELATED THREATS TO 
UNITED STATES INTERESTS (2013); CARL ROPER, TRADE SECRET THEFT, INDUSTRIAL 
ESPIONAGE, AND THE CHINA THREAT (2014). 
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its five group members.2 Research published by the Information 
Warfare Monitor, including a rather disturbing report on GhostNet, also 
traced cyberespionage and other intrusive activities back to computers 
located in China.3 
Most recently, the unprecedented cyberattack on Sony’s movie 
studio—allegedly from North Korea4—delayed and scaled back the 
nationwide theatrical release of the film The Interview.5 The intrusion 
not only embarrassed studio executives and Hollywood in general, but 
also raised cybersecurity concerns among the U.S. business 
community.6 In the wake of this attack, President Barack Obama called 
for greater cooperation between the government and the private sector 
to protect cybersecurity and the country’s critical infrastructure,7 which 
includes “oil pipelines, railroad tracks, water treatment facilities and the 
power grid.”8 He also issued an executive order to promote the 
voluntary “sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks and 
incidents.”9 
Taking advantage of the forum provided by this timely 
Symposium, this Article closely examines the ongoing debate on 
China’s sustained effort in using online hacking and other intrusive 
techniques to steal trade secrets and proprietary data from U.S. 
 
 2 See Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of 
Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at A1 (reporting the indictment). 
 3 INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, TRACKING GHOSTNET: INVESTIGATING A CYBER ESPIONAGE 
NETWORK (2009); INFO. WARFARE MONITOR & SHADOWSERVER FOUND., SHADOWS IN THE 
CLOUD: INVESTIGATING CYBER ESPIONAGE 2.0 (2010); see also Sarah McKune, “Foreign 
Hostile Forces”: The Human Rights Dimension of China’s Cyber Campaigns, in CHINA AND 
CYBERSECURITY, supra note 1, at 260, 274 (“While these investigations did not generate 
conclusive evidence of Chinese government backing, the interest and/or involvement of the 
Chinese state is probable in light of the targeted entities and technical forensics indicating China 
as the location of the command-and-control servers employed.”). 
 4 But see Nicole Perlroth, Experts Question U.S. Account of Sony Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
29, 2014, at B4 (stating that “private security researchers are increasingly voicing doubts that the 
hack of Sony’s computer systems was the work of North Korea”). 
 5 See David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Is Said to Find North Korea Behind 
Cyberattack on Sony, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at A1 (reporting that “the four largest theater 
chains in the United States—Regal Entertainment, AMC Entertainment, Cinemark and Carmike 
Cinemas—and several smaller chains said they would not show ‘The Interview’ as a result of the 
[terrorist] threat”). 
 6 See Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Attack Is Unraveling Relationships in 
Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2014, at B1 (reporting that “[t]he attack has disrupted the web 
of executive, business and talent relationships that stitches together Sony’s core moviemaking 
operation”); Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony’s Dirty Laundry, for All to See, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2014, at B1 (reporting the disclosure of executive salaries, unpublished scripts, sensitive 
contracts, aliases used by stars to check into hotels, and a highly embarrassing email exchange 
between Sony’s co-chairwoman and a film producer). 
 7 Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Obama Calls for New Cooperation to Wrangle the 
“Wild West” Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2015, at B1. 
 8 Nicole Perlroth, Hacked vs. Hackers: Game On, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at F1. 
 9 Exec. Order No. 13,691 (Feb. 13, 2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-
shari. 
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businesses. Part I outlines the five common narratives that have thus far 
been advanced to recount this widely criticized effort. Sensing the 
narratives’ negative overtones, Part II offers five modest suggestions on 
how a more positive debate can be constructed to help identify ways to 
reduce online hacking and data breaches as well as to enhance the 
protection of trade secrets and proprietary data. 
I.     FIVE COMMON NARRATIVES 
From ancient Egyptians to the Warring States in China, espionage 
and intelligence activities have been undertaken for millennia to collect 
information and to steal military secrets.10 While these activities 
received wide news coverage during the Cold War era, many of them 
have now migrated to the digital environment, the Internet in particular. 
Owing to “its logistical advantages and the promise of plausible 
deniability,” the online environment is especially attractive.11 Indeed, 
the recent proliferation of online hacking and data breaches from abroad 
have led policymakers and commentators to discuss these activities in 
connection with cyberwarfare, information warfare, or what Eric 
Schmidt and Jared Cohen recently popularized as the “New Code 
War.”12 
Nevertheless, what China has been accused of seems to be quite 
different from what the Soviet Union used to do during the Cold War 
era. Instead of stealing state and military secrets, Chinese hackers are 
now also targeting business, technical, scientific, and industrial 
information.13 It is therefore understandable why Chinese hacking 
activities have become a major concern for U.S. policymakers and 
businesses alike. 
To the Obama administration, for example, “there is a major 
 
 10 See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 230 (2010) (“Nations have been engaging in 
espionage at least since biblical times.”); Nigel Inkster, The Chinese Intelligence Agencies: 
Evolution and Empowerment in Cyberspace, in CHINA AND CYBERSECURITY, supra note 1, at 29, 
29 (“The concept of intelligence is . . . well entrenched in Chinese culture dating back to the time 
of the warring states (c. 475–221 B.C.), when Sunzi’s Art of War (Sunzi bingfa), which deals at 
length with the subject of espionage, appeared.”). 
 11 WILLIAM C. HANNAS ET AL., CHINESE INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE: TECHNOLOGY 
ACQUISITION AND MILITARY MODERNISATION 218 (2013); see also INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, 
supra note 3, at 12 (“[T]he challenge of identifying perpetrators and understanding their motives 
gives state actors convenient plausible deniability and the ability to officially distance themselves 
from attacks.”); ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE 
FUTURE OF PEOPLE, NATIONS AND BUSINESS 104 (2013) (“A cyber attack might be the state’s 
perfect weapon: powerful, customizable and anonymous.”). 
 12 SCHMIDT & COHEN, supra note 11, at 112. 
 13 See ROPER, supra note 1, at xiii (“When the USSR was still in existence, information 
collected was more of military and political in nature. Since its demise, more theft has occurred, 
with China being the culprit this time—in both volume and specificity—and it is not just military 
or political, but runs the entire gamut of just about every area you could think of.”). 
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difference between spying for national security purposes, something the 
United States does daily, and the commercial, for-profit espionage 
carried out by China’s military.”14 As reported in The New York Times: 
[W]hen Mr. Obama raised the issue [about online hacking] with Xi 
Jinping, the Chinese president, he focused only on commercial 
espionage, arguing it is far more pernicious to use the intelligence 
instruments of the state for a business advantage. The United States 
may do all it can to learn about China’s nuclear arsenal, or Beijing’s 
intentions in its territorial disputes with Japan, but it does not, he 
says, steal from China Telecom to help AT&T.15 
The line the U.S. administration draws between fair play and foul 
play, however, is not as clear as one would expect. Not only do most 
countries—democratic or otherwise—fail to recognize it,16 this line is 
also not always drawn in situations involving U.S. intelligence and 
surveillance efforts. As The New York Times continued in its report: 
[T]he United States spies regularly for economic advantage when the 
goal is to support trade talks; when the Clinton administration was 
locked in a high-stakes negotiation in the 1990s to reach an accord 
with Japan, it bugged the Japanese negotiator’s limousine. At the 
time, the chief beneficiaries would have been the Big Three auto 
companies and a smattering of parts suppliers. It is also widely 
believed to be using intelligence in support of trade negotiations 
underway with European and Asian trading partners.17 
In addition, a top secret document obtained by Edward Snowden, a 
former National Security Agency contractor, showed that “an American 
law firm [had been] monitored while representing a foreign government 
in trade disputes with the United States,” the lawyers’ attorney-client 
privilege notwithstanding.18 If the U.S. administration considered it a 
matter of national security to spy on a local law firm defending a 
foreign government in a trade dispute, it is not difficult to understand 
why other countries have had a tough time drawing the line between 
commercial espionage and national security. This difficulty is 
particularly acute in a country such as China, given the perceived 
 
 14 David E. Sanger, With Spy Charges, U.S. Draws a Line That Few Others Recognize, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2014, at A8. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. (“[W]hile American officials are loath to admit it, Washington’s view has relatively 
few advocates around the world. The French, for example, were notorious for conducting state-
backed corporate espionage long before the Chinese mastered the form.”); Jon R. Lindsay, 
Introduction: China and Cybersecurity: Controversy and Context, in CHINA AND 
CYBERSECURITY, supra note 1, at 1, 13 (“American attempts to articulate the difference between 
the political-military targets of US cyber espionage and the economic targets of Chinese 
espionage, or between Internet control as practiced by China and metadata collection as practiced 
by the [National Security Agency], have tended to fall on deaf ears.”). 
 17 Sanger, supra note 14. 
 18 James Risen & Laura Poitras, Spying by N.S.A. Ally Entangled U.S. Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 16, 2014, at A1. 
134 CARDOZO LAW  REVIEW  D E•NOVO  2015 
“overlap between security and economic concerns” among Chinese 
policymakers19 and the continued domination of state-owned enterprises 
in the local business environment. It is also worth recalling that the 
Obama administration has repeatedly invoked national security to 
justify the nondisclosure of the negotiating texts of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement.20 
Thus far, five common narratives have emerged concerning the 
online hacking and data breaches conducted by Chinese hackers. This 
Article will examine each narrative in turn. 
A.     U.S. Businesses 
The first narrative focuses on the interests and frustrations of U.S. 
businesses. The lack of protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in China has been the subject of a perennial debate about 
China.21 Although the country’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), repeated amendments of intellectual property 
laws and regulations, and increased provision of enforcement resources 
have greatly strengthened the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, the protection of trade secrets and proprietary data 
remains inadequate—and, from the standpoint of U.S. rights holders, 
woefully inadequate. 
In March 2014, for instance, a former DuPont employee and his 
accomplice were found guilty of selling to a Chinese company 
DuPont’s trade secret concerning the use of titanium dioxide to whiten 
products.22 This conviction joined a long line of convictions and arrests 
 
 19 Adam Segal, Chinese Economic Statecraft and the Political Economy of Asian Security, in 
CHINA’S RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA 146, 147 (William W. Keller & 
Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2007); see also Schmidt & Sanger, supra note 2 (noting that “the 
Chinese, with their vast state-owned enterprises, many run by the People’s Liberation Army, have 
often argued that economic security and national security are one”). 
 20 For discussions of a lack of transparency in the negotiations surrounding these agreements, 
see generally David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation 
of International Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105 (2012); Peter K. 
Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 998–1019 (2011). 
 21 For the Author’s earlier discussions on piracy and counterfeiting in China, see generally 
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007) [hereinafter Yu, 
China Puzzle]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China 
in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to 
Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 
901 (2006); Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. 
INT’L L. 209 (2011). 
 22 Karen Gullo, California Man Guilty of Stealing DuPont Trade Secrets, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Mar. 5, 2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-
05/california-man-guilty-of-stealing-dupont-trade-secrets.html. 
2015 TRADE SECRET H ACKING  135 
generated from Chinese industrial espionage activities.23 Following the 
DuPont case and other similar complaints, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) raised the priority of trade secret protection in 
the China enforcement agenda. As he stated in the 2014 Special 301 
Report: 
[T]rade secret theft is a serious and growing problem in China. 
Thefts may arise in a variety of circumstances, including those 
involving departing employees, failed joint ventures, and cyber 
intrusion and hacking. In addition, thefts arising from the misuse of 
information submitted to government entities for purposes of 
complying with regulatory obligations are particularly troubling. The 
misappropriation of trade secrets and their use by a competing 
enterprise can have a devastating impact on a company’s business, 
making recourse to adequate and effective legal remedies particularly 
important.24 
According to this report, cyberintrusion and online hacking have been 
repeatedly used to steal trade secrets and proprietary data from U.S. 
businesses. Also of concern are the “thefts arising from the misuse of 
information submitted to government entities for purposes of complying 
with regulatory obligations.”25 Such information includes the 
undisclosed clinical trial data submitted by U.S. pharmaceutical and 
agrochemical industries to Chinese regulatory authorities.26 
China’s need for trade secrets, proprietary data, and other 
confidential information is understandable considering its ongoing and 
rapidly growing efforts to boost independent innovation. These efforts 
were driven in large part by such government policies as the Outline of 
the National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology 
Development (2006–2020) and the Outline of the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy.27 These outlines were released by the State Council 
 
 23 See HANNAS ET AL., supra note 11, at 256–70 (providing the case histories of Chinese 
industrial espionage). 
 24 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], 2014 SPECIAL 301 
REPORT 32 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT]. 
 25 Id. 
 26 For discussions of the protection of clinical trial data, see generally Carlos M. Correa, 
Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade 
Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
81 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING HEALTH]; Meir Perez Pugatch, 
Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Access, in NEGOTIATING 
HEALTH, supra, at 97; Jerome H. Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed 
Clinical Trial Data: From Private to Public Goods?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra, at 133; 
Robert Weissman, Data Protection: Options for Implementation, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 
supra, at 151; Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in 
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs Agreement, 
45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443 (2004). 
 27 See Peter K. Yu, Five Oft-repeated Questions About China’s Recent Rise as a Patent 
Power, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 78, 88–96 (discussing these outlines and China’s 
independent innovation policies). 
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in February 2006 and June 2008, respectively. 
B.     Chinese Businesses 
The second narrative concerns the interests of Chinese businesses. 
Although these businesses do not always appreciate the external 
pressure the USTR has exerted on their government, they see the 
benefits of legal reforms and improvements in the intellectual property 
regime. Like their foreign counterparts, Chinese businesses are deeply 
frustrated by the inadequate protection local laws have afforded to trade 
secrets, proprietary data, and other confidential information. The lack of 
intellectual property protection may also have cost them more than their 
foreign counterparts.28 
To be fair, China already offers trade secret protection under its 
contract, criminal, intellectual property, joint venture, labor, and tort 
laws.29 Nevertheless, because the protection comes from many different 
statutes and regulations, it is piecemeal at best. Even worse, the Law 
Against Unfair Competition—the statute of choice for many rights 
holders—is badly outdated. This statute was enacted the year after 
China and the United States signed the 1992 Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property30 and close to a 
decade before China joined the WTO.31 Since its enactment in 1993, 
this unfair competition law has not been revised, even though 
consultations about its revision have already begun.32 The lack of 
legislative overhaul in this area stands in sharp contrast to the repeated 
amendment of other intellectual property laws. While the Patent and 
Trademark Laws have already been amended three times, the Copyright 
Law is now undergoing its third wholesale revision.33 
 
 28 See Barry Naughton & Yao Yang, The Economic Relationship, in DEBATING CHINA: THE 
U.S.–CHINA RELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS 21, 29 (Nina Hachigian ed., 2014) 
(“[W]eak [intellectual property] protection not only hurts American firms but Chinese firms as 
well. In fact, it may hurt Chinese firms more.”). 
 29 See SHAN HAILING, THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN CHINA 35–37 (2008); Liu 
Xiaohai, Unfair Competition/Trade Secrets/Know-how (2), in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAWS 127, 136–38 (Rohan Kariyawasam ed., 2011) [hereinafter 
CHINESE IP LAWS]. 
 30 Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, 
China–U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995). Although an earlier memorandum of understanding 
covering software protection was signed in 1989, the 1992 memorandum was the “first full 
bilateral [intellectual property] agreement” between China and the United States. Joseph A. 
Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection, 1986–2006, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 235 (2006). 
 31 China formally became the 143rd WTO member on December 11, 2001. Members and 
Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.
htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 32 See Liu, supra note 29, at 160. 
 33 The Third Amendment to the Patent Law was adopted in December 2008, while the Third 
Amendment to the Trademark Law was adopted in August 2013. For a discussion of the 
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To local businesses, the external push by the USTR and American 
businesses for trade secret reform can therefore be beneficial even if 
they dislike foreign criticisms. Such a push would help generate the 
momentum needed for legal reform. It would also enable local 
businesses to preserve the hard-earned political capital for future 
actions. In fact, external pressure has historically played a critical role in 
fostering intellectual property reforms in China. Leading examples are 
the establishment of the modern intellectual property system in the 
1980s and the strengthening of intellectual property rights in the run-up 
to China’s WTO accession.34 
Notwithstanding the eagerness of local businesses to join their 
foreign counterparts in pushing for trade secret reform, it remains 
unclear whether the Law Against Unfair Competition will be merely 
updated or whether a new trade secret law will be introduced.35 While 
an updated statute would certainly provide rights holders—local and 
foreign alike—with stronger protection, the latter seems to be what U.S. 
businesses prefer. After all, the current unfair competition law was 
written from a focus on unfair competition and anti-monopoly 
protection.36 The statute does not protect trade secrets as a form of 
property the same way U.S. trade secret laws do.37 
 
evolution of the Chinese patent system, see generally Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder: Three 
Decades of Development of the Chinese Patent System, 5 WIPO J. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Yu, 
Building the Ladder]. 
 34 See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 21, at 185–88 (discussing how the external pressure 
exerted by the United States provided the momentum needed for the early intellectual property 
reforms in China). 
 35 See Liu, supra note 29, at 161 (“Scholars and practitioners . . . suggest establishing a 
special law for the protection of trade secrets; however, no such official legislative plan exists at 
present.”). 
 36 For discussions of Chinese trade secret laws, see generally SHAN, supra note 29; Hu 
Kaizhong, Unfair Competition/Trade Secrets (1), in CHINESE IP LAWS, supra note 29, at 106; 
Liu, supra note 29. 
 37 Compare Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of Trade Secret Law: Article 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act on Which It Is Based, in THE LAW AND THEORY 
OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 537, 546–47 (Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) [hereinafter TRADE SECRECY HANDBOOK] (“By 
some accounts, the United States insisted [during the TRIPS negotiations] that trade secrets were 
a form of property and resisted tying trade secret protection to unfair competition principles.”), 
with Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa [Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair 
Competition] art. 1 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, 
effective Dec. 1, 1993), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/12/content_1383803.htm (“This Law is formulated with a view to safeguarding the healthy 
development of socialist market economy, encouraging and protecting fair competition, 
repressing unfair competition acts, and protecting the lawful rights and interests of business 
operators and consumers.”); Hu, supra note 36, at 109 (stating that the Law Against Unfair 
Competition “attempts to reflect current business practice in commercial markets and the need to 
regulate market competition”). 
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C.     Chinese Government Officials 
The third narrative draws on the positions taken by Chinese 
government officials, especially those hardliners who frequently 
condemn the external pressure exerted by the USTR and American 
businesses. Indeed, past pressures and accusations from the United 
States have led to kneejerk protests and oppositions from Chinese 
officials. As Chinese Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu declared: “We urge 
the US to abandon its Cold War mindset, stop making groundless 
accusations against China, and do more to improve mutual trust 
between the two nations and friendship between the two peoples.”38 
The reactions of these officials are unsurprising, considering that 
online hacking and information warfare have been practiced by virtually 
all countries capable of such practices,39 the United States included.40 In 
their recent book, Cyber War, Richard Clarke, the former National 
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-
terrorism, and Robert Knake observed: 
U.S. intelligence officials do not . . . rate China as the biggest threat 
 
 38 Espionage Accusations Against China “Groundless,” CHINA.ORG.CN (May 15, 2009), 
http://china.org.cn/international/2009-05/15/content_17780594.htm. 
 39 As Major Arie Schaap of the U.S. Air Force observed: 
As of 2007, there were an estimated 120 countries working on cyber attack commands, 
and in 10 to 20 years experts believe we could see countries jostling for cyber 
supremacy. States are no doubt preparing to launch international all-out online attacks 
and the current political environment includes countries testing the waters to gauge the 
potential influence, and risks, of such assaults. The assistant director of the FBI’s cyber 
division stated that computer attacks pose the biggest risk “from a national security 
perspective, other than a weapon of mass destruction or a bomb on one of our major 
cities.” NATO’s Chief of Cyber Defense concurs, stating that “cyber terrorism [and] 
cyber attacks pose as great a threat to national security as a missile attack.” 
Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law, 64 
A.F. L. REV. 121 (2009) (footnotes omitted); see also ROPER, supra note 1, at xiii (“China is not 
alone in collecting information for its own economic and military expansion. To some extent, 
every country seeks out information on other countries.”); POINDEXTER, supra note 1, at 121–22 
(“Real spying . . . is done by almost every government in the world. If the Chinese spy on us, they 
do it with clear understanding that we spy on them too. Every country spies on the others as much 
as they can support. In all the world’s governments we understand spying and expect it.”). 
 40 A notable example is the computer worm Stuxnet, which Israel and the United States 
jointly designed to infiltrate the computers controlling Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Derek 
Bambauer called this worm “the most advanced cyberweapon built to date.” Derek E. Bambauer, 
Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2014). As he recounted: 
[Stuxnet] performed two clever tasks: it sped up the centrifuges that enrich uranium, 
damaging some irreparably, and it concealed the acceleration from the engineers 
monitoring the system. Stuxnet recorded data from normal centrifuge operations and, 
while sabotaging the centrifuges, replayed the normal data to the engineers, falsely 
reassuring them. One piece of sophisticated malware succeeded where diplomacy and 
threats of military force failed—it set back Iran’s attempts to craft a nuclear weapon by 
at least a year, and likely longer. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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to the U.S. in cyberspace. “The Russians are definitely better, almost 
as good as we are,” said one. There seems to be a consensus that 
China gets more attention because, intentionally or otherwise, it has 
often left a trail of bread crumbs that can be followed back to 
Tiananmen Square. . . . Other nations known to have skilled cyber 
war units are Israel and France. U.S. intelligence officials have 
suggested that there are twenty to thirty militaries with respectable 
cyber war capability, including those of Taiwan, Iran, Australia, 
South Korea, India, Pakistan, and several NATO states. “The vast 
majority of the industrialized countries in the world today have 
cyber-attack capabilities,” said former Director of National 
Intelligence Admiral Mike McConnell.41 
Even more troubling for Chinese officials, the United States’s 
accusations often ignore the significant progress China has made in the 
intellectual property arena as well as the considerable resources that the 
country has poured into intellectual property enforcement in the past 
decade. To date, China not only has built a new intellectual property 
system from the ground up faster than any other country in history,42 it 
also has the world’s largest volume of intellectual property litigation.43 
At some point, one has to query whether the scale of piracy and 
counterfeiting in China has been so enormous that the expectations of 
the USTR and American businesses are somewhat unrealistic. 
For many Chinese officials, the United States’s accusations are 
also highly disturbing, as they fail to take note of China’s recent re-
emergence as an innovative power.44 Since 2012, more than two million 
patent applications have been filed annually with the State Intellectual 
Property Office.45 This two million figure was a target for 2015 in 
 
 41 CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 10, at 63–64. 
 42 See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 33, at 15; see also Jack Valenti, Letter to the 
Editor, China’s Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at A26 (“China has accomplished what 
no other country has achieved.”). 
 43 See J. Benjamin Bai & Da Guoping, Strategies for Trade Secrets Protection in China, 9 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 351 (2011) (“China became the world’s most litigious 
country for intellectual property disputes in 2005, surpassing the U.S. in the number of 
intellectual property lawsuits filed annually.”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: 
Revealing the New China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS L.J. 773, 775 (2011) (“In 
2005, there were 12,159 patent, copyright, and trademark cases filed in the United States, 
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whereas China’s was 15,159.”); Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property 
Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 525, 544–49 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Rise and Decline] 
(discussing the potential intellectual property litigation explosion in China). 
 44 For discussions of China’s rise as an innovative power, see generally SHAUN REIN, THE 
END OF COPYCAT CHINA: THE RISE OF CREATIVITY, INNOVATION, AND INDIVIDUALISM IN ASIA 
(2014); Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 43, at 529–32; Richard P. Suttmeier & Yao Xiangkui, 
China’s IP Transition: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights in a Rising China (The National 
Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report No. 29, 2011), available at http://china-
us.uoregon.edu/pdf/IP_report.pdf. 
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China’s National Patent Development Strategy.46 Although David 
Kappos, the then-director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
found the announced target “mind-blowing,”47 that figure was already 
surpassed three years ago. 
In addition, according to the statistics from the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, China had the world’s third largest volume of 
applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in 2014, behind 
only the United States and Japan.48 Among all the corporate applicants, 
Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corporation had the largest and third 
largest number of PCT applications, respectively.49 In the same period, 
China also ranked seventh in filing international trademark applications 
under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration 
of Marks and its related protocol.50 With 20,309 designations, China 
was the world’s “most designated member country in international 
registrations” within the Madrid System.51 
Given the progress China has made in the trademark and patent 
areas—and, to some extent, also the copyright area52—one cannot help 
but wonder whether the USTR and American businesses are simply 
going down the list of intellectual property demands. These demands 
started off with copyrights, patents, and trademarks—issues that were 
highly contentious in the 1980s and 1990s. Now that these demands 
have been largely met, the demandeurs seem to have just moved on to 
trade secrets and other areas of intellectual property law. 
Although it is logical for demandeurs to go down their list of 
demands, this approach is particularly frustrating and demoralizing to 
Chinese policymakers, as it suggests the impossibility of satisfying the 
USTR and American businesses. In the view of these policymakers, 
China will be accused of intellectual property theft regardless of the 
progress it has made in the intellectual property field. Even worse, the 
demandeurs seem to have a rather narrow focus—a focus that is driven 
not by an overall analysis, but by the U.S. competitive advantage. Thus, 
from the standpoint of many Chinese policymakers, unless China 
focuses its reform on rights that benefit U.S. rights holders, the progress 
the country has made in other areas of intellectual property law will be 
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conveniently ignored. 
More damningly for the United States, just as the Obama 
administration was heavily criticizing China for hacking into computers 
on U.S. soil, news about Edward Snowden and the U.S. government’s 
global surveillance program received front-page coverage.53 This 
coverage not only caused the United States to lose its moral high 
ground, but also provided a vivid reminder that all governments conduct 
surveillance and intelligence activities. To a large extent, the news 
about Snowden was as ill-timed as Secretary Tommy Thompson’s 
reported threat to break Bayer’s patent on ciprofloxacin following the 
anthrax attacks in 2001.54 Most policymakers and commentators from 
abroad considered his threat hypocritical because around that time the 
USTR and the American pharmaceutical industry were aggressively 
pressuring South Africa and other developing countries to stop issuing 
compulsory licenses to address public health crises, including those 
brought about by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.55 
Moreover, many U.S. allies, such as France, have actively 
practiced industrial espionage. As reported on CBS News, leaked U.S. 
diplomatic cables showed that “France [had been] the country that 
conduct[ed] the most industrial espionage on other European countries, 
even ahead of China and Russia.”56 An editorial from The New York 
Times also noted France’s “aggressi[on] in spying to benefit domestic 
companies.”57 If the U.S. administration is willing to look the other way 
in the case of France, why does it single out China for its complaints? 
Did the charges suggest a double standard? Or did they represent yet 
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Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 257, 280 (2002) (discussing the anthrax attacks 
in the United States). 
 55 See id. (“The U.S. lost significant international legitimacy when the overwhelming 
hypocrisy of its own efforts regarding anthrax were juxtaposed against the efforts of developing 
countries to secure cheap access to AIDS drugs.”); José Marcos Nogueira Viana, Intellectual 
Property Rights, the World Trade Organization and Public Health: The Brazilian Perspective, 17 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 311, 313 (2002) (“U.S. and Canadian approaches to the anthrax scare is 
precisely what the Brazilian government has been doing over the past two years in response to 
HIV/AIDS.”); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 727, 777–78 (2011) (noting that “the United States’ short-sighted exploration of compulsory 
licensing as an option to lower the price of ciprofloxacin following anthrax attacks in 2001 . . . 
suggested a double standard”). 
 56 Joshua Norman, WikiLeaks: France Leads Russia, China in Industrial Spying in Europe, 
CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011, 11:02 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/wikileaks-france-leads-
russia-china-in-industrial-spying-in-europe. 
 57 Editorial, America, China and the Hacking Threat, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2014, at SR10; 
see also David E. Sanger & Tim Weiner, Emerging Role for the C.I.A.: Economic Spy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, § 1, at 1 (“France has spied on American companies for years, planting 
moles in companies like Boeing and Texas Instruments and breaking into hotel rooms to rifle 
through attache cases.”). 
142 CARDOZO LAW  REVIEW  D E•NOVO  2015 
another round of complaints that the administration had to mount to 
diffuse domestic political pressure? 
D.     TRIPS Commentators 
The fourth narrative pertains to the commentary on the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement). Article 39.2 of the Agreement specifically protects 
information that “is secret . . . [,] has commercial value . . . and . . . has 
been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person 
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.”58 Although the 
protection offered in this provision is modelled after the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act in the United States,59 the language eventually adopted in 
the TRIPS Agreement remains broad and vague. 
Equally problematic is Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which mandates protection against the unfair commercial use of clinical 
trial data that have been submitted to regulatory agencies for the 
approval of pharmaceutical or agrochemical products that have utilized 
new chemical entities.60 While the bilateral, regional, and plurilateral 
trade agreements that the United States established in the past decade 
called for the institution of a data exclusivity regime,61 Article 39.3 does 
not introduce such a requirement. 
More disappointing to the U.S. pharmaceutical and agrochemical 
industries, the TRIPS language includes four additional limitations. 
First, Article 39.3 protects pharmaceutical or agrochemical products 
that have “utilize[d] new chemical entities.”62 It does not intend to cover 
“existing chemical entities that have been reformulated or sold for a 
new indication.”63 Second, Article 39.3 protects regulatory data “against 
unfair commercial use.”64 With a specific purpose in mind, the 
provision does not offer general protection to, or create exclusive rights 
 
 58 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39.2, Apr. 15, 
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in, the collected data.65 Third, although Article 39.3 protects these data 
against “disclosure,” it does not expressly prohibit regulatory authorities 
from making use of or relying on the data, such as when the data are 
used in conjunction with the bioequivalence studies submitted by 
generic drug manufacturers.66 Finally, Article 39.3 anticipates the need 
for disclosure when it is “necessary to protect the public.”67 The 
provision therefore includes a built-in exception. 
The existence of these many limitations is understandable, 
considering that undisclosed information “has never been the subject of 
any multilateral agreement before”—an observation aptly made by 
Jayashree Watal, a former TRIPS negotiator for India who now works 
in the WTO Intellectual Property Division.68 Given the novelty of this 
multilateral arrangement, it is no surprise to find compromise language 
in Article 39.3. Such language not only reflects the developed countries’ 
failure to achieve consensus during the TRIPS negotiations,69 but also 
foretells the immense and ongoing challenge of developing greater 
international protection of trade secrets and proprietary data. 
 
 65 See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL 
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themselves from relying upon the original registration file for a drug when comparing it to the 
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E.     Human Rights Organizations 
The final narrative highlights the concerns of human rights 
organizations, which have actively participated in the U.S.–China 
debate. Although intellectual property industries have always taken the 
position that the intellectual property system has successfully 
internalized the protection of human rights,70 human rights 
organizations, commentators, and activists beg to differ. For example, in 
the Statement on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights 
released in August 2000, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights reminded governments of “the primacy 
of human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements.”71 
A year later, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights released a 
highly critical report on the many human rights challenges created by 
the TRIPS Agreement.72 In a recent article, I also underscored the 
tensions, conflicts, and other impediments that bilateral, regional, and 
plurilateral trade agreements have posed to greater protection of human 
rights.73 
More specifically for our discussion, there is an “uncertain grey 
line between state secrets and trade secrets.”74 From a human rights 
standpoint, the failure to appreciate the challenge of drawing this line 
has serious consequences. Only recently, American policymakers, 
businesses, and press expressed concern about the trial (and later 
conviction) of Peter Humphrey and his wife, both of whom had been 
accused of illegally acquiring private personal information during their 
investigation for GlaxoSmithKline.75 A few years ago, the Australian 
government, businesses, and press also criticized China’s heavy-handed 
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treatment of four Rio Tinto employees, who were initially accused of 
espionage and stealing state secrets but were later charged with and 
convicted of bribery and trade secret theft.76 
Indeed, the foreign criticisms in the state secret area are often 
incompatible with those in the trade secret area. More troubling, both 
sets of criticisms tend to overlook the historical fact that trade secrets 
originated in China as a form of state secret.77 Because state-owned 
enterprises, and by extension the state, were often involved in the early 
days of trade secret protection in China, the roots of such protection 
diverged significantly from those found in Australia or the United 
States. 
To be certain, one could still debate about whether the Chinese 
state secret law is vague and arbitrary or whether it has been unfairly 
applied to foreign nationals, such as the Humphreys or the four Rio 
Tinto employees.78 It is also important to question whether the line 
between business secrets and state secrets has been properly drawn in 
China, given the very different nature of the secret information 
involved. Regardless of one’s position in these debates, however, it is 
not difficult to notice the unconvincing and self-serving positions taken 
by foreign governments, businesses, and media. To many foreign 
critics, whether the protection of secret information in China should be 
strengthened or weakened depends largely on whether the law protects 
their own interests. 
II.     FIVE MODEST SUGGESTIONS 
Given the highly sensitive and polarized nature of the U.S.–China 
debate and the depth of the problem concerning online hacking, data 
breaches, and trade secret protection, this Article does not attempt to 
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identify the needed legal and policy reforms. Instead, this Part outlines 
five modest suggestions on how a more constructive debate can be 
developed to narrow the differences between China and the United 
States. In doing so, it seeks to identify ways to reduce online hacking 
and data breaches as well as to enhance the protection of trade secrets 
and proprietary data. 
First, as far as the debate on China’s effort to steal trade secrets 
and proprietary data is concerned, it is important to be more specific 
about the type of secret involved. Does the debate concern state secrets, 
political secrets, military secrets, personal secrets, scientific or 
technological secrets, or business, industrial, or trade secrets? 
Obviously, the U.S. government and businesses care about the 
theft of more than one type of secret. In fact, they may care about the 
protection of all types of secrets. Nevertheless, different types of secrets 
implicate disparate laws and policies. Not only may the justifications for 
these laws and policies differ, their strengths and weaknesses may also 
vary. In addition, distinctive exceptions, limitations, and safeguards 
may have been built into the implicated laws and policies. 
Thus, the more we can pinpoint the type of secret involved, the 
easier it will be to improve our understanding of the complicated issues, 
and the more likely we will be able to develop a well-reasoned debate. 
A more specific focus and a more concrete discussion will also help 
policymakers, commentators, and businesses to locate the solutions 
needed to address the ongoing challenge. 
The second suggestion concerns the need to update the 
international standards for protecting trade secrets and other undisclosed 
information. The TRIPS Agreement—Article 39, in particular—was 
drafted based on standards available in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. As Daniel Gervais, who was working at the GATT/WTO 
Secretariat at the time of the TRIPS negotiations, observed, “TRIPS 
adjusted the level of intellectual property protection to what was the 
highest common denominator among major industrialized countries as 
of 1991.”79 It is therefore no surprise that many Chinese and U.S. 
businesses have found the TRIPS standards for the protection of trade 
secrets and undisclosed information inadequate. 
Nevertheless, until the international community, or at least China 
and the United States,80 can agree on new international minimum 
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standards, it is unlikely that the dispute between China and the United 
States can be easily resolved. Although amending the TRIPS 
Agreement provides the most obvious path to revise these standards, the 
standards can also be modified through the negotiation of new bilateral, 
regional, and plurilateral agreements, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 
Because China has thus far been excluded from the negotiation of these 
agreements,81 it remains to be seen what other opportunities exist for 
these two countries to reach an agreement on the new standards for 
trade secrets and proprietary data. 
The third suggestion regards the need for the U.S. government and 
American businesses to identify the specific deficiencies in current 
Chinese law, as opposed to making only vague criticisms. For 
illustrative purposes, consider the USTR’s discussion of the Law 
Against Unfair Competition in his 2014 Section 301 Report: 
Under Chinese law . . . available remedies are difficult to obtain, 
given that civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement against 
trade secrets theft remains severely constrained. Enforcement 
obstacles include various deficiencies in China’s AUCL [Law 
Against Unfair Competition]; constraints on gathering evidence for 
use in litigation; difficulties in meeting the criteria for establishing 
that information constitutes a trade secret; and criminal penalties that 
do not provide adequate deterrents. Unlike other Chinese 
[intellectual property] laws, the AUCL does not expressly authorize 
judges to issue certain provisional orders that are often critical to the 
successful pursuit of a civil enforcement action. While China’s new 
Civil Procedure Law may address, or partially address, that problem, 
there has been insufficient time to ascertain whether this new law is 
facilitating access to civil remedies in practice. Additionally, the 
AUCL appears to apply primarily to “commercial undertakings” and 
not to impose liability on individual actors; the AUCL also requires 
that a trade secret have “practical applicability,” which may limit the 
scope of protection for early stage research.82 
While the last sentence in this excerpt provides concrete 
suggestions for trade secret reform in China, the second sentence does 
not. The USTR is right to point out the many enforcement obstacles in 
China. However, the discussion of these obstacles has existed for more 
than two decades.83 If they cannot be removed in the copyright, patent, 
and trademark areas, why would the situation be any different for trade 
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secrets?84 Moreover, enforcement obstacles implicate areas that are both 
relevant and irrelevant to intellectual property protection. For similar 
reasons, “constraints on gathering evidence”85 pose challenges to all 
forms of litigation. Even if Chinese intellectual property policymakers 
are sympathetic to the concerns of the USTR and American businesses, 
it is unclear how easy it would be for these policymakers to address 
issues that go beyond their mandate and field of expertise. 
The fourth suggestion relates to our need to develop a holistic and 
more contextualized debate on the protection of trade secrets and 
proprietary data—perhaps by taking into account the economic, social, 
and cultural aspects of such protection. As much as laws and policies 
are needed to improve the protection of undisclosed proprietary 
information, we also need to think more about whether those laws and 
policies would respond to the divergent local business, employment, 
and cultural conditions. In a recent book, Catherine Fisk wrote: “As 
workplace knowledge became corporate intellectual property, the 
combination of new legal and business practices transformed not only 
work relations but also class relations for creative people.”86 In her 
view, the protection of trade secrets, proprietary data, and workplace 
knowledge concern not only rights holders, but also other people 
involved. 
In a very crowded environment such as China, it is not always easy 
to protect trade secrets and other confidential information, not to 
mention that many Chinese are still accustomed to using inside 
knowledge to show connections, earn respect, enhance stature, or 
indicate actual power or influence.87 The protection of trade secrets also 
goes hand in hand with the reasonable measures taken to maintain 
secrecy. Article 39.2 of the TRIPS Agreement specifically mentions the 
“reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in 
control of the information, to keep it secret.”88 In many jurisdictions, 
courts determine the grant of trade secret protection based on whether 
the right holders have taken reasonable security measures.89 Given the 
requirement of having these measures and the inevitable variations over 
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what measures would be deemed reasonable in the circumstances,90 it is 
logical to question whether the trade secrets protected in one country 
would automatically be protected in another. 
The final suggestion pertains to our need to develop a deeper and 
more sophisticated understanding of information flow. This flow 
involves not only trade secrets and proprietary data, but also all other 
types of information. Developing such an understanding is important, 
because the flow of information, like water or heat, is often hard to 
control. As Hans von Baeyer put eloquently: 
As humans, we not only acquire information through our senses, we 
also feel compelled to share it with each other. From the first cries of 
emerging humans that we hear echoed from a baby’s crib, from the 
gossip of cave-dwellers around the communal fire to our satellite-
transmitted e-mail messages, the appetite for information has been as 
integral to the human condition as the hunger for food and love.91 
Thus, instead of focusing on preventing the flow of information—
through legal protection or otherwise—it is increasingly important to 
reframe the debate as one about risk management and damage 
mitigation.92 
While some would certainly fear that the information flowing to 
China could harm the United States—by, perhaps, undermining the 
latter’s competitive advantage—the same flow of information could 
also create opportunities while promoting collaboration between 
Chinese and U.S. businesses. After all, businesses are unlikely to work 
with each other if they do not understand what others are doing or if 
their approaches are vastly different. 
At the macro level, an active flow and exchange of information is 
also important because it can help improve or stabilize the oft-turbulent 
U.S.–China relationship. As Zhou Enlai, the former Chinese premier, 
once told Henry Kissinger, “When you have become familiar with 
[China], it will not be as mysterious as before.”93 Richard Clarke and 
Robert Knake concurred: “Knowing what another nation’s capabilities 
are and having a view into what they are doing behind closed doors 
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usually contributes to stability.”94 
In sum, the flow of information does not always harm a country; it 
depends on the type of information involved. To avoid throwing away 
the baby with the bath water, we need to develop a deeper and more 
sophisticated understanding that separates the good flow of information 
from its bad flow. In doing so, we will be able to focus more on risk and 
damage than on protection per se. While some information should be 
protected, other should be allowed to flow freely. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown how the parties in the current U.S.–China 
debate on online hacking and trade secret protection continue to talk 
past each other. To help identify reform options that benefit both sides, 
the Article offers five modest suggestions on how a more positive 
debate can be constructed. Although these suggestions will in no way 
resolve the ongoing dispute between China and the United States, it is 
my hope that they will provide an important step toward strengthening 
the protection of trade secrets and proprietary data in China. 
Policymakers, commentators, and the media remain fascinated by 
the potential conflict between Chinese culture and intellectual property 
reforms—a proposition other commentators and I have repeatedly 
questioned.95 Trade secrets, however, is not an area in which such a 
conflict has arisen. In this area, China and the United States actually 
share some common and historical interests. 
In China, the efforts to protect workplace knowledge and technical 
information date back to centuries ago. During the Qing Dynasty, for 
example, “the producers of the celebrated Tongren Temple line of 
medicines . . . sought to maintain the confidentiality of their 
manufacturing process by employing only family members or eunuchs, 
or by keeping vital parts of the process secret from nonfamily 
employees.”96 Given this longstanding tradition and the common 
interests between China and the United States, it is indeed lamentable 
that these two countries have thus far failed to work more closely 
together to strengthen the protection of trade secrets and proprietary 
data. Such strengthened protection would benefit not only American 
businesses but also Chinese industries. 
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